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Exploiting variation in welfare reform across states and over time and using relevant comparison groups,
this study estimates the effects of welfare reform on an important source of human capital acquisition
among women at risk for relying on welfare: vocational education and training. The results indicate
that welfare reform reduced enrollment in full-time vocational education and had no significant effects
on part-time vocational education or participation in other types of work-related courses, though there
is considerable heterogeneity across states with respect to the strictness of educational policy and the
strength of work incentives under welfare reform. In addition, we find heterogeneous effects by prior
educational attainment. We find no evidence that the previously-observed negative effects of welfare
reform on formal education (including college enrollment), which we replicated in this study, have
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A major goal of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 was to move recipients off of cash assistance and into the labor force. The 
legislation imposes time limits on welfare receipt, expands work requirements for recipients, and 
allows states to impose stricter sanctions for non-compliance with work requirements and other 
rules. PRWORA’s “work first” approach de-emphasizes education and training, representing a 
departure from previous approaches that encouraged human capital formation as a strategy for 
achieving self-sufficiency. Although minor mothers are required to attend high school or training 
in order to receive welfare and are not subject to time limits or work requirements if they are 
full-time students, PRWORA sharply restricts the extent to which adult recipients can count 
education and training as required work activities.  
Few studies have investigated the effects of welfare reform on educational acquisition of 
adult women even though the vast majority of mothers on welfare are adults, education and 
training activities are common among adults beyond traditional ages for schooling, and 
PRWORA de-emphasized education for this group. Previous research using a quasi-experimental 
design has found that welfare reform decreased the probability of both high school and college 
enrollment among adult women. No previous research has investigated the effects of welfare 
reform on vocational education and training, defined broadly as educational training that 
provides practical experience in a particular occupational field, despite the importance of this 
type of education for women likely to be on welfare. In 1995, 23% of unmarried mothers in the 
U.S. age 25-54 with less than a college education participated in non-college work-related 
courses (authors’ own calculations from the dataset used for this study). 





multiple years before and after welfare reform, we exploit variation in welfare policy across 
states and over time and use relevant comparison groups to estimate effects of welfare reform on 
vocational education and training of adult women who are at risk for relying on welfare—those 
who are unmarried, have low education, and have dependent children. Limitations in counting 
education and training as authorized work activities may increase the cost of engaging in those 
activities for adult mothers on welfare and thereby decrease their participation in any educational 
activities, including vocational education and training. However, if work and education are 
complementary (e.g., if welfare reform increases access to vocational education or training 
through employers), welfare reform could increase this type of education. Finally, findings from 
previous research that welfare reform decreased the probability of college enrollment among 
adult women leave open the possibility that women affected by welfare reform substituted 
vocational education and training for formal higher education. Thus, the effects of welfare 
reform on this important type of human capital acquisition for women at risk for relying on 
welfare are an important gap in the welfare reform and education literature. 
Background  
The PRWORA legislation of 1996 ended entitlement to welfare benefits under Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) block grants to states. Among the features of TANF and many pre-
PRWORA state waiver programs,
1 which together constitute “welfare reform,” were time limits 
on the receipt of welfare benefits, work requirements as a condition of receiving welfare, and 
                                                 
1 Although welfare reform is often dated to the landmark 1996 PRWORA legislation, reforms actually started taking 
place in the early 1990s when the Clinton Administration greatly expanded the use and scope of “welfare waivers” 
to allow states to carry out experimental or pilot changes to their AFDC programs, with random assignment required 
for evaluation. Waivers were approved in 43 states, ranging from modest demonstration projects to broad-based 
statewide changes, and constituted the first phase of welfare reform. Many policies and features of state waivers 





sanctions for non-compliance with program rules. PRWORA also strengthened child support 
enforcement and made it easier for married and cohabiting couples to qualify for welfare 
benefits. These sweeping changes ushered in a new “work first” era that de-emphasized 
education for adult women. The PRWORA legislation granted considerable discretion to states 
in establishing welfare eligibility and program rules. As a result, there is substantial state policy 
variation within the broad national regime of time-limited cash assistance for which work is 
required.  
In terms of reducing caseloads, welfare reform (including the pre-PRWORA waivers) has 
been successful; welfare rolls have declined by over 50% since their peak in 1994 and at least 
one-third of the caseload decline can be explained by welfare reform (see Grogger & Karoly 
2005). At the same time, employment rates of low-skilled mothers rose dramatically (Ziliak 
2006), and at least some of that increase was a result of welfare reform (Schoeni & Blank 2000). 
The effects on family structure are less dramatic. A large literature on the effects of welfare 
reform on marriage and a smaller one on cohabitation reveal mixed findings, and the literature on 
non-marital childbearing and female headship indicates slightly negative but inconsistent effects 
of welfare reform (Blank 2002, 2007; Moffitt 1992, 1995, 1998; Grogger & Karoly 2005; 
Gennetian & Knox 2003; Peters, Plotnick & Jeong 2003; Ratcliffe et al. 2002). 
Welfare reform and education 
Traditionally, mothers on AFDC were not required to work and were allowed to attend 
school if they so chose. The situation changed for some mothers under the Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, which was created under the Family Support Act of 1988 
and required states, to the extent resources allowed, to engage mothers with no children below 





participation in JOBS, and between 1992 (just prior to the first statewide AFDC waiver program) 
and 1996 (enactment of PRWORA) only 10% of all welfare recipients in the U.S. participated in 
JOBS programs.
2  
Major statewide AFDC waiver programs, first implemented in late 1992, substantially 
altered the nature of welfare by imposing time limits, significantly reducing participation 
exemptions, imposing sanctions, increasing earnings disregards, imposing family caps, and/or 
implementing work requirements. Compared to JOBS programs, statewide waivers were broad-
based in that they applied to large proportions of welfare recipients. While states were required 
to provide many specifics of their programs in their waiver plans, they were not required to 
report policies vis-à-vis educational activities. Complicating the picture, states could change their 
policies without having to amend their waiver plans (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 1997). The situation changed notably under TANF, which required states to file detailed 
program specifics (including educational policies) at the outset as well as any intended changes 
to those policies. That is, under TANF, the extent to which educational activities could count 
toward work requirements was more explicit. Because of the reporting issues under the waivers, 
it is difficult to compare educational policies under AFDC waivers and TANF, even in a given 
state. However, it is clear that under both AFDC waivers and TANF, work and other 
requirements gave women less flexibility in deciding how to spend their time and many welfare 
recipients could attend school or vocational training only after fulfilling work requirements. 
The PRWORA legislation treats education and training programs very differently 
depending on whether the potential recipient is a teen or an adult. The “work first” approach is 
                                                 
2 Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, “Overview of Entitlement Programs” for 1994 







targeted to adult mothers, for whom the legislation sharply restricts the extent to which education 
and training can count as required work activities. In particular, PRWORA limits the extent to 
which education or training can count toward federal work participation requirements, generally 
restricting the length of full-time education and training to 12 months and for no more  
than 30 percent of TANF participants (Martinson & Strawn 2003). In contrast, minor mothers are 
subject to the “human capital” approach, as they are required to attend high school or training 
(and to live with their parents or in another approved setting) in order to receive welfare and are 
not subject to time limits or work requirements if they are full-time students. Several studies 
using quasi-experimental designs have examined the effects of welfare reform on teen drop-out 
rates (Hao & Cherlin 2004; Kaestner, Korenman & O’Neill 2003; Offner 2005; Dave, Reichman 
and Corman 2008; Koball 2007). Overall, the available evidence suggests that welfare reform 
has had favorable effects on high school completion of teenage girls. 
For adult women, the situation vis-à-vis welfare reform and education is very different 
than that for teens. By requiring work and imposing restrictions on education and training, 
welfare reform increased the costs of engaging in such activities for this group. However, it also 
potentially increased the benefits of education and training, since the five-year lifetime limit 
created greater incentives for women to become more engaged in the labor market. Thus, it is not 
clear a priori whether welfare reform would have been expected to decrease or increase adult 
women’s investments in education and training. 
As far as we know, only two previous studies used nationally representative data and 
quasi-experimental designs to investigate the effects of welfare reform on adult women’s 
educational enrollment and those focused on formal education. The more comprehensive study, 





Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1992 to 2001 to estimate the effects of 
welfare reform on high school and college enrollment of adult women using a difference-in-
differences methodology. The primary focus was on college enrollment, because the number of 
women in the relevant sample attending high school was quite small. The target group for the 
analyses of college enrollment was women aged 24-49 who were unmarried, had less than a 
college degree, and had minor children in the household, while the comparison group was 
women in the same age range and with the same educational levels but who had no children. 
They found that welfare reform reduced college enrollment by about 20% The authors also 
examined the extent to which college enrollment varied by state TANF education and work 
incentive policies and found that the negative effects of welfare reform on college enrollment 
were stronger in strict states (those that did not allow post-secondary education to be considered 
a valid work-related activity and those with stricter work requirements) than in more lenient 
states. Finally, they found that women who worked 20 or more hours per week were far less 
likely than those who worked fewer hours to attend college. 
In an earlier study, Jacobs and Winslow (2003) compared the probability of post-
secondary education enrollment at 2 points in time: 1995 and 2000 (using March CPS data) and 
1995 and 1999 (using the National Household Education Survey—NHES). The CPS analysis 
included information on state policies but restricted the analysis to women age 16 to 24 (thereby 
missing many adults who may be affected by welfare reform) and confounding the differential 
educational incentives for teens versus adults. The NHES analysis included women of all ages, 
but did not include state policy data. In the CPS analysis, they found that single mothers are less 
likely to go to college post-welfare reform, holding welfare receipt constant, and that adult 





those in stricter states to attend college. In the NHES analysis, they found that single mothers are 
more likely to attend college after welfare reform but that welfare receipt negatively affects 
enrollment. A shortcoming of this study is that it takes snapshots at 2 points in time and 
attributes all changes to PRWORA. Also, using 1995 as the pre-reform comparison would 
provide biased estimates because welfare reform was well under way by then (19 states had 
already implemented major AFDC waivers).  
Overall, both previous studies found that welfare reform decreased acquisition of post-
secondary education among women at risk for relying on welfare, and that the stricter the 
policies, the more negative the effects. Both studies, in their conclusions, discuss the possibility 
that other types of human capital acquisition may be more desirable or cost/effective than college 
education for women at risk for relying on welfare and that this group may have substituted 
vocational education or training for formal education as a response to welfare reform. To date, 
no studies have examined this question. Given that the existing literature indicates that welfare 
reform has led to decreases in formal education among adult women, the next obvious question 
is whether less formal, vocationally-oriented education has also decreased or whether welfare 
reform led to a substitution of vocational education for formal education. 
Vocational education and training 
Vocational education and training activities are not uncommon among adult women. For 
example, 80% of females taking vocational courses in the U.S. in 2006 were age 25 years or 
older (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). Figures on vocational education for population subgroups, 
such as low-educated unmarried women (i.e., women at risk for relying on welfare) are not 
readily available, and presenting some relevant statistics in that regard is one of the contributions 





(both degree-granting and vocational programs) are about the same for returning adult students 
as for traditional-age students. Welfare recipients are more likely to attend two-year rather than 
four-year colleges, and those who do so are less likely than non-recipients to graduate (London 
2006). However, each year of credit at a community college yields, on average, a 5 to 8% 
increase in annual earnings—a return similar to that from one year of a four-year college 
(review, Kane & Rouse 1999). Thus, it appears that there are positive returns to vocational 
education in a formal school setting. Several studies have also examined returns to less formal 
vocational training activities as a form of human capital acquisition and found that such training, 
even firm-specific training, imparts a positive effect on wages (Veum 1999; Loewenstein & 
Spletzer 1999; Marcotte 2005). Frazis, Gittleman, and Joyce (2000) found a strong positive 
association between formal educational attainment and employer-provided or employer-financed 
training, and Marcotte (2005) suggests that complementarities between the two types of 
education have been growing over time. To the extent that complementarities exist between 
vocational training and formal education for women at risk for relying on welfare, we would 
expect that welfare reform had a negative impact on vocational education and training.  To the 
extent that complementarities exist between work and access to work-related training, we would 
expect that higher employment rates among at-risk women due to welfare reform would have a 
positive impact on vocational education and training. 
Data 
We use data from the National Household Education Survey (NHES), which collects 
information about the educational activities of the U.S. population. Specifically, we use the 
Adult Education Supplements administered in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005, which 





vocational education. We define any vocational education as having participated in a full-time 
vocational education program, part-time vocational education program, or other work-related 
courses. Full-time vocational education includes full-time activity toward a diploma or certificate 
from a vocational or technical school after high school or a formal vocational training program. 
It excludes those enrolled in any degree-granting program. It includes full-time community 
college enrollment if the individual is in the process of obtaining a certificate or diploma but not 
a degree. Our measure of part-time vocational education corresponds to the measure of full-time 
vocational education but pertains to part-time enrollment. Our measure of other work-related 
courses pertains to courses that are vocationally oriented but not part of a degree or vocational 
program. These are usually part-time and short-term, and include activities such as courses taken 
at one’s job, courses taken anywhere else that relate to one’s job or new career, or courses taken 
for a license or certification for one’s job.  
In our main analyses, we estimate models for participation in full time vocational 
education, part time vocational education, and other work-related courses, as defined above; a 
composite of those three, which we call “any vocational education;” and employer-paid 
education (that for which an employer paid for some or all of educational expenses or for the 
employee’s time during which those activities occurred). The last outcome includes college in 
addition to the three types of vocational education. In other analyses, we examine enrollment in 
full-time and part-time degree programs (college or university) and in any type of education or 
training (college or any type of vocational education).  
We attach measures of state implementation of welfare reform to the NHES data. Welfare 
reform was implemented in two phases. The first consists of federal waivers granted to states to 





Services has had the authority to waive federal welfare rules if a state proposed experimental or 
pilot programs that furthered the goals of AFDC. Some waivers increased the amount of earnings 
that recipients were allowed to keep while maintaining welfare eligibility; others expanded work 
requirements to larger groups, established term limits for cash assistance, permitted states to 
issue sanctions to recipients who failed to meet work requirements, or allowed states to eliminate 
increases in benefits to families who had additional children while on welfare. We construct an 
indicator to reflect whether a given state in a given month and year had a statewide waiver in 
place that substantially altered the nature of AFDC with regard to time limits, work exemptions, 
sanctions, earnings disregards, family caps, and/or work requirements.
3 The second phase of 
welfare reform was the implementation of TANF programs post-PRWORA. Because all states 
implemented TANF programs between the 1995 survey and the 1999 survey, all states are coded 
with a zero for TANF implementation for 1991 and 1995, and a one for subsequent years.
4 These 
two measures follow the convention in the literature (reviewed in Blank 2002). For simplicity of 
exposition and because we find that the waiver/TANF distinction does little to enhance our 
analyses and has no bearing on our inferences, our primary measure of welfare reform combines 
the two into a dichotomous indicator of whether the state had either an AFDC waiver or TANF 
in place during the time period measured. However, we conduct corresponding analyses that 
include the separate indicators for AFDC waivers and TANF (several specifications are 
presented in Appendix Table 2 and the others are available upon request). Finally, in certain 
                                                 
3 The educational variables in the NHES reference the prior year. Based on the respondent’s month of interview, we 
therefore match welfare reform policies that were in place in the respondent’s state of residence during the midpoint 
of the past 12 months. Eleven states enacted major waivers to their AFDC programs across various months, between 
1992 and 1994. Estimates are robust to alternative measures of the fraction of the past year (since the month of 
interview) that the welfare policy was in effect. 
4 Information on state implementation of major AFDC waivers and TANF is obtained from the Assistant Secretary 






models we estimate differential effects by state educational policies, sanctions, and benefit 
generosity under TANF, as described later. 
Since welfare reform is measured at the state level, we incorporate additional state-
specific socioeconomic measures in the analyses to capture time-varying trends within areas. 
State unemployment rate and per capita personal income are derived from figures provided by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Welfare caseloads, defined as the total number of welfare 
recipients in a state, are obtained from the Department of Health and Human Service’s 
Administration for Children and Families Office of Family Assistance.
5 All models further 
include indicators for whether a given state in a given year had a strict high school exit exam 
(testing material at or above the 9
th grade level) or a less strict exam (below the 9
th grade level), 
with the reference category being no high school exit exam. For women who completed high 
school, we use the existence of the exam during their eighteenth year. For those who did not 
complete high school, we use the contemporaneous existence of the exam in their state. These 
data are derived from the Appendix provided by Dee & Jacob (2007).  
Methods 
  The primary aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of welfare reform on adult 
women’s vocational education and training. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DDD) framework – akin to a pre- and post-comparison with treatment and control groups – in 
conjunction with multivariate regression methods, which is standard in the economics literature 
on evaluating the effects of welfare reform and other state policies (e.g., Kaestner & Tarlov 
2006; Bitler, Gelbach & Hoynes 2005; Blank 2002). Under certain conditions, described below, 
this quasi-experimental research design will yield causal estimates of the effects of welfare 
                                                 





reform on our outcomes of interest. We conduct various specification and robustness checks to 
assess the validity of the identification assumptions underlying this methodology. 
  Consider the following DDD model which relates changes in educational outcomes to 
implementation of welfare reform for the target group relative to a comparison group: 
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Equation 1 posits that the educational outcome (E), for the i
th woman residing in state s during 
year t, is a function of welfare reform implementation (WR), measured here by an indicator 
reflecting whether a given state has enacted either a statewide AFDC waiver or TANF (based on 
the respondent’s interview month and year). In addition, educational acquisition depends on a 
vector of individual characteristics (X) such as age, race, ethnicity, highest grade completed, and 
urban residence, a vector of time-varying state characteristics (Z) such as economic conditions 
and educational policies, state fixed effects (States), and year fixed effects (Yeart).  The 
parameter μ represents an individual error term.
6  
There are several benefits to estimating Equation 1. It bypasses having to estimate the 
structural model relating welfare reform to welfare caseloads, which has been problematic in the 
literature (Kaestner & Tarlov 2006; Blank 2002).
7 Equation 1 is also more policy relevant as it 
represents the reduced-form model directly linking welfare policy measures to key outcomes, 
                                                 
6 We estimate equation (1) via OLS, though results are not affected when probit or logit methods are employed. All 
models control for the sampling weights as a covariate to increase efficiency, as recommended in Korn and 
Graubard (1995) and because the NHES over-sampled those who participated in educational activities. Reported 
standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary correlation across observations within each state. 
7 Changes in welfare caseloads are not due solely to welfare policy. Research suggests that much of the drop in 
caseloads, especially prior to TANF implementation in 1996, was not policy-related. While the welfare caseload fell 
dramatically in the 1990s, only part of the decline (≤ 35 %) was due to welfare reform legislation (Blank 2002). 





and therefore accounts for any and all mechanisms through which welfare policy may be 
affecting educational acquisition.  
The direct focus on welfare reform, either an AFDC waiver or TANF,  also underscores 
the point that the population of interest, that which is affected by welfare reform legislation, is all 
women at risk of being on public assistance, and not just current or former program participants 
(Kaestner & Tarlov 2006). Welfare reform can affect exit rates as well as entry rates. 
Considering all women at risk addresses some of the limitations from leavers’ studies, which 
focus solely on individuals who have left welfare. These studies find it difficult to differentiate 
individuals who leave public assistance voluntarily from those who left because of welfare 
reform policies. They also do not consider the experiences of individuals who have been diverted 
from public assistance as a result of policy shifts. Potential welfare recipients are shown to 
behave strategically in their use of welfare benefits when faced with time limits and other 
regulatory constraints (DeLeire et al. 2006; Grogger 2004). Thus, in order to identify the 
population effect of welfare reform on key outcomes, the appropriate sample is all women at risk 
of being on public assistance.  
Traditionally, the welfare caseload has consisted primarily of low-educated, unmarried 
mothers. This at-risk population group is the target group, for whom welfare policy would be 
expected to have the largest behavioral effects. In addition to the state-varying trends we 
consider when estimating equation (1),  the possibility of omitted variables remains. This 
problem is addressed in the DDD framework by considering a comparison group – individuals 
who are similar in many ways to the target group but are unlikely to participate in public 
assistance programs and therefore not likely to be affected by welfare policies. In the above 





group (population at risk of being on welfare) and zero if the individual is in the comparison 
group (population not at risk of being on welfare). The DDD estimates of the effects of welfare 
reform are the coefficients of the interaction terms between the policy measures (WR or, in 
supplemental analyses, separate indicators for AFDC Waiver and TANF) and the Target group 
indicator.
8 The impact of welfare reform is identified using variation in the timing and incidence 
of welfare reform across different states over time.  
The assumption necessary for the DDD effect to represent an unbiased estimate is that in 
the absence of welfare reform, unobserved state-varying factors would affect the target and 
comparison groups similarly. Consequently, the choice of target and comparison groups is 
integral to a valid implementation of the DDD methodology. Following the literature, we employ 
target and comparison groups that are conventionally defined (Dave et al. 2008; Kaushal and 
Kaestner 2001; Kaestner and Kaushal 2003). Identifying the target group for our analyses—
individuals who are at risk of relying on public assistance—is relatively straightforward. As 
indicated earlier, welfare reform is likely to have its strongest behavioral impacts on unmarried 
mothers with low levels of education and their children. As such, we compare unmarried women 
ages 25-54  who have less than a college education and live with children (target group) to 
unmarried women in the same age and education groups who do not live with any children 
(comparison group).  
We confirm that baseline means between the target and comparison groups were similar 
in 1991, the period that predated any welfare reform. For instance, unadjusted weighted 
differences in full-time college enrollment (-0.0054), part-time college enrollment (-0.0193), and 
                                                 
8 For parsimony, Equation 1 imposes the restriction that, within states, the effects of the non-welfare reform 
measures (vectors X, Z, Year and State*t) are similar for the target and comparison groups. In supplemental 
analyses, we estimated all models allowing the effects of X and Z to differ across target and comparison groups, by 
including interactions between the target indicator and X and Z. Coefficient magnitudes are not materially affected, 





any vocational education (-0.0051) between the target and comparison groups were insignificant. 
Individuals in the comparison group were significantly more likely (by about 10 percentage 
points) to participate in work-related courses in 1991 relative to the target group; this is to be 
expected since labor force participation and employment were much higher among individuals in 
the comparison group relative to individuals at-risk of welfare assistance (target group) who 
were not required to work in order to receive welfare benefits. Trends between 1991 and 1995 
(excluding states that had implemented major AFDC waivers) were also generally similar 
between the groups for these measures; for work-related courses, the increasing trend was 
qualitatively similar for both groups but somewhat steeper for the target group. Some of this 
confounding is likely due to differential effects of the economic expansion on employment 
between the target and comparison groups as work-related courses are expected to be highly 
complementary to employment. We are therefore careful to control for measures of economic 
activity in all models, and in fact when we do so, the baseline difference in work-related courses 
between the target and comparison groups is attenuated by 60 percent and the difference in trend 
becomes statistically insignificant.  
One concern is that states may have implemented major waivers to their AFDC programs 
in response to economic conditions or the behavior of welfare caseloads on the state. Therefore, 
all models control for one- and two-year lags of the state unemployment rate, real personal 
income per capita, and welfare caseloads.
 9   We conduct several specification checks to assess 
the robustness of our estimates. First, in alternate models, we include state-specific trends to 
                                                 
9 Results (available upon request) are virtually unchanged  if these lagged covariates are excluded from the models.  
In alternate models, we also control for a larger vector of state-specific factors including state child support 
expenditures, minimum wage, and poverty rates. Results (available upon request) are highly robust with respect to 
both magnitudes and significance.  This robustness to additional controls for state-varying factors is validating since 
in a well-specified DD model, the comparison group accounts for time-shifting unobservable factors; thus, results 





account for systematically-varying unobservable factors within each state.  Second, we assess 
whether our estimates are sensitive to the choice of the comparison group by utilizing an 
alternate comparison group (low-educated married women with children) that has also been used 
in the welfare reform literature.  Third, we estimate alternate specifications only for individuals 
in the target group, separately controlling for state-specific prevalence of vocational and work-
related educational engagement among unmarried women with no children and married women 
with children (individuals who are not likely to be impacted by welfare policies) to capture 
general trends in these educational activities.  Our estimates remain generally robust across all of 
these specifications, adding to the weight of the evidence bearing on our conclusions. 
Results  
The results are organized as follows. Table 1 replicates previous work that estimated the 
effects of welfare reform on college attendance. Tables 2 and 3 present our main results--effects 
of welfare reform on vocational education and training and on employer-subsidized education. 
Table 4 presents results from models that stratify by state TANF policies vis-a-vis education, 
sanctions, and benefit generosity in order to explore effect heterogeneity along those dimensions. 
These analyses also assess the plausibility of our estimates by checking for a “dose-response” 
relation based on whether the effects are expectedly larger for stricter states. In Table 5, we allow 
for heterogeneous effects of welfare reform on vocational education by prior formal educational 
attainment, allowing us to explore complementarity between formal and vocational education. In 
Table 6, we present estimates from models of welfare reform on any schooling (formal or 
vocational education) to assess overall effects on potential human capital acquisition. In all 
tables, the estimated effects of welfare reform are indicated by the (bolded) coefficients on the 





been rounded to the nearest 10, and we perform weighted analyses per National Center for 
Education Statistics guidelines. 
In Table 1, we replicate previously discussed findings, based on the October supplement 
of the CPS, of Dave, Reichman and Corman (2008) that welfare reform reduced college 
enrollment of adult women at risk of relying on welfare.  The estimates for any enrollment and 
full-time enrollment confirm these previous findings, although that for any enrollment is 
imprecisely estimated.  For instance, welfare reform is associated with a 3.7 to 3.9 percentage 
points decline in college enrollment among low-educated single mothers ages 25-54, relative to 
similar aged and educated women without children.
 10  Estimate magnitudes and standard errors 
are robust to the inclusion of state-specific trends.  Sample sizes vary across outcomes because 
individuals engaging in types of education other than that being modeled are excluded from the 
sample (for example, the 2,910 observations in Column 3 consist of women who either engaged 
in no education or full-time degree education, and excludes women who engaged in any other 
type of education or training). Thus, the reference group in all models consists of individuals 
who did not participate in any schooling or training, making the marginal effects directly 
comparable across all specifications.  
Table 2 presents our main results. As indicated earlier, nationally representative statistics 
are not readily available for vocational education participation among women at risk for relying 
on welfare—before or after welfare reform. As shown in the bottom row, in 1990-1991 (our 
“baseline” pre-welfare reform period), about 4.5% of women at-risk for welfare (aged 25 to 54 
years, less than college-educated, unmarried, and with dependent children) were enrolled in a 
                                                 
10 For any degree enrollment, we find a higher-magnitude effect than the corresponding estimate by Dave, Reichman 
& Corman (3-4 percentage points versus 1-2 percentage points). This is partly due to a somewhat higher prevalence 
of any degree enrollment for the target group in the NHES relative to the October CPS (11.6 percent vs. 8.9 
percent), suggesting that the educational focus of the NHES may be picking up greater participation in degree-





full-time vocational education program at some point during the year. Another 1.8% had been 
enrolled in a part-time vocational program, and another 13.6% had engaged in any other work-
related courses during the year. Thus, about 20% of women at-risk for welfare participation 
engaged in some type of vocational education and over one-quarter were engaged in either 
vocational training or formal college education. For vocational education, the most common type 
was short-term, part-time training that does not lead to a degree or diploma (“any other work 
related courses”). We also find that  almost 14% of women at risk for welfare reform in 1990-
1991 received employer-subsidized education (including college or any type of vocational 
education). 
The estimates in Columns 2-4 of Table 2 indicate that welfare reform reduced full-time 
vocational enrollment by about 4 percentage points but increased part-time vocational education 
by one percentage point. This latter represents a large effect relative to the baseline mean, though 
this effect is imprecisely estimated. There is no significant or substantial effect of welfare reform 
on participation on any other work-related training. When the three types of vocational education 
are combined (Column 1), we find no evidence that welfare reform had a significant impact on 
vocational education among women at risk for relying on welfare. In addition, we find no 
significant effects of welfare reform on employer-subsidized education.  Table 3 presents 
estimates from models that control for state-specific trends; effect magnitudes and standard 
errors are not materially affected. 
We would expect the negative effects of welfare reform on vocational education to be 
particularly strong in states that do not permit or that limit education as an authorized work 





way interaction between TANF, target, and state TANF education policy.
11 Specifically, we 
created a dichotomous variable equal to one if the state never allows post-secondary or other 
education to substitute for work requirements, or imposes substantial time limits on the duration 
of the educational activities. We then interacted this variable with our TANF*Target variable.
12 
None of these states allow schooling, as a stand-alone activity, to satisfy work requirements. 
Since these state educational policies specifically refer to TANF, we focus on the TANF effect in 
these models and exclude states that had already implemented welfare reform through major 
waivers to AFDC prior to TANF implementation.  
Although measured with some imprecision due to reduced effective cell size, we find that 
the negative effect of TANF on full-time vocational education becomes stronger in strict states 
and approaches zero in states that have more lenient policies with respect to educational 
enrollment. We also find some evidence of heterogeneity with respect to part-time vocational 
enrollment. That is, in lenient states, at-risk women are more likely to attend part-time vocational 
programs (by about 8 percentage points), and in strict states, at-risk women are less likely to 
attend such programs (by about 7 percentage points) relative to the lenient states. Combining the 
effects over all states thus yielded a net one percentage point increase in part-time vocational 
education. There is also some suggestive evidence of differential effects for other work-related 
courses (1.7 percentage points decline among the stricter states relative to the lenient states, and 
a 2.4 percentage points increase among the lenient states), though the difference here is not as 
                                                 
11 We investigate only TANF because there is no known source of information on educational policies under AFDC 
waivers. 
12 Specifically, we examined these policies at two points in time (1999 and 2002), and designated states as "strict" if 
they did not allow education as a stand-alone activity and they did not allow schooling to be combined with other 
work activities for more than one year. Twenty-two states (AZ, CO, CT, FL, ID, IN, KS, LA, MA, MD, MI, MS, 
ND, NM, NY, OH, OK, OR, SD, TX, WA, WI) and D.C. fall into this category. The data, available on the State 
Policy Documentation Project website, can be found at: http://www.spdp.org/tanf/postsecondary.PDF and 





large as for vocational training. This is not surprising, since these courses do not represent major 
financial commitments compared to the other two categories. 
We would also expect the effects of welfare reform on vocational education to be 
stronger in states with strict work incentives, such as sanctions for non-compliance with work 
requirements and low benefits generosity. As above for TANF education policy, we interacted a 
measure of strict state sanctions in Panel B and a measure of low or medium (relative to high) 
benefits generosity in Panel C (as characterized by Blank & Schmidt 2001). Again, we find 
significant differential effects on vocational education depending on strict versus less strict 
states. That is, women in states with stricter work incentives were less likely than women in 
more lenient states to engage in full-time and part-time vocational education. 
As discussed earlier, more highly educated individuals are more likely than those with 
lower educational levels to engage in work-related courses. Thus, it is possible that our overall 
results may mask important differences in propensity to engage in vocational education within 
the at-risk population. Table 5 presents results that allow for differential effects of welfare 
reform depending on whether the woman had a high school diploma (about 70% of the target 
group). Because of small cell sizes, we present results only for the two largest categories of 
vocational education (any vocational education and work-related courses) and for employer-
subsidized schooling (which includes college as well as vocational education).  Similar to the 
above analyses of heterogeneous effects based on state variation in TANF policies, we interact 
our main DD effect (Welfare Reform*Target) with an indicator for whether the woman had a 
high school diploma.  The coefficient of this triple interaction term (Welfare Reform* Target* 
High School Graduate) represents the effects of welfare reform for those at-risk women who 





Although imprecisely estimated, we find that for women with less than a high school 
diploma, welfare reform reduced any vocational education by about 3 percentage points and any 
other work-related courses by about 6 percentage points. Relative to these women with less than 
a high school education, welfare reform is associated with a 2.6 and 6.8 percentage points 
increase any vocational education and work-related courses, respectively.  Overall, for these 
high-school graduates, there is no appreciable negative effects of welfare reform (sum of the 
coefficients of Welfare Reform*Target and Welfare Reform*Target*High School Graduate).  
These findings suggest that limitations in counting education and training as authorized work 
activities increase the cost of engaging in those activities overall, but that complementarities 
between work and education (such as access to employer-subsidized education) may largely 
offset those effects for high school graduates. The results for employer-subsidized education are 
consistent with this scenario. Although welfare reform had small and statistically insignificant 
effects on employer-subsidized education (Table 2), we see here that the effects were negative 
for the least educated women while small but positive for those with at least a high school 
diploma relative to those with less than a high school education. 
Table 6 considers the overall effects of welfare reform on any type of education (formal 
college, vocational programs, or work-related courses). These estimates address the question of 
whether the decrease in formal schooling found by Dave et al. (2008) and corroborated in this 
study were tempered by increases in informal schooling in the form of vocational training and 
work-related courses. Models 1 and 2 (excluding and including state-specific trends, 
respectively) estimate average effects of welfare reform across the sample, while models 3 and 4 
consider differential effects of welfare reform by the woman’s prior education. From the first 





on overall educational participation, which is consistent with the separate findings for college 
and vocational enrollment (in Tables 1 and 2, respectively). From the last two columns, we can 
see that for women with at least a high school diploma, this effect is substantially attenuated. 
Together, these estimates suggest that while welfare reform led to overall declines in educational 
acquisition among women at risk for relying on welfare, the effects were confined for the most 
part to very low-educated women. The effects for women with a least a high school diploma 
appear to have been offset by increases in employer-subsidized education (from Table 5). In 
other words, the “work first” strategy under welfare reform appears to have had uneven impacts 
in terms of its effects on educational acquisition, with the most disadvantaged (in terms of 
completed education) falling even farther behind and the others experiencing neutral effects. 
In additional specifications (not shown) we used an alternative comparison group—
married women (with children in the household) in the same age range and with the same 
education levels as the target group—and found that results were consistent in terms of both 
effect magnitudes and significance relative to those presented in Tables 2 and 3. The only 
substantive difference is that we find a significant decrease in other work-related courses, 
confirming that welfare reform seemed to have an overall negative effect on the target women's 
human capital acquisition through formal education and training.  
When the target and comparison groups are defined according to characteristics, such as 
education, parental status, and marital status, which may themselves be affected by welfare 
reform, potential bias due to compositional selection is a concern. We confirm that key 
characteristics used to define the target and comparison groups have not changed significantly 
over the sample period. For instance, 6.85 percent of all women are classified into the target 





percent in 2005. Similarly, the prevalence of marriage among low-educated women and the 
number of children among low-educated unmarried and married women have remained 
relatively stable over the sample period. Thus, selection bias with respect to parental and marital 
status or family structure is unlikely, and this is consistent with prior research which has also 
found weak to no effects of welfare reform on those as outcomes. 
As an alternative check for compositional selection, we also assessed whether welfare 
reform can predict who is in our analysis sample and who is in the target versus comparison 
samples (controlling for observed covariates).  In both cases, welfare reform is not significantly 
or substantially associated with the probability of inclusion in the analysis sample (target or 
comparison group relative to all others) or inclusion in the target group relative to the 
comparison group (marginal effect of -0.008).  When the welfare reform indicator is separated 
into AFDC waivers and TANF, we find that neither is significantly associated with the 
probability of inclusion in the analysis sample.  However, TANF appears to reduce the 
probability that an adult woman is observed in the target group by about 6 percentage points 
(about 10% relative to the baseline prevalence of the target indicator). Since the only difference 
between the target and comparison groups is the presence of minor children in the household, 
this result could reflect changes in household structure post-TANF, such as formation of multi-
family or intergenerational households (outcomes that have not been explored in the welfare 
reform literature). Thus, women who may otherwise have been in the target group are classified 
in the comparison group potentially because their living arrangements were affected by welfare 
reform. Since about 10 percent of the target group potentially shifted into the comparison sample 
as result of welfare reform, it should be noted that this would attenuate observed DDD effects by 





conservative and compositional selection has a negligible effect on the results. It is also 
validating that results are robust to alternate definitions of the comparison group as noted above. 
Appendix Table 1 presents the separate effects of state AFDC waivers and TANF 
implementation on all reported educational outcomes.  The patterns and magnitudes of the 
estimates are consistent with those discussed above with respect to the overall welfare reform 
indicator.  In addition, both AFDC waivers and TANF similarly impacted educational outcomes; 
we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in effects between the two indicators.  
This is consistent with the results reported in Table 4, which suggest that work incentives were a 
key mechanism through which welfare reform impacted educational outcomes, and both AFDC 
waivers and TANF imposed strict work requirements as a condition for receiving benefits.     
Conclusion  
We found robust and convincing evidence that welfare reform significantly decreased the 
probability of full time vocational training and had no significant effects on part-time vocational 
education acquisition or participation in any other type of work-related education among adult 
women on average. We also found considerable heterogeneity across states, suggesting that 
states with stricter educational policies and stronger work incentives experienced larger declines 
in full- and part-time vocational training participation. Indeed, participation in part-time 
vocational education appears to have significantly increased (relative to no education or training) 
in lenient states. The negative effects of welfare reform on vocational education appear to be 
confined to women with less than a high school education. We found no evidence that the 
previously-reported negative effects of welfare reform on enrollment in formal education 
(particularly college), which we replicated in this study, have been offset by increases in 





decrease adult women’s education and training overall, and again, the effects appear to be 
confined to those with very low levels of completed education. 
The results from this study fill an important gap in the welfare reform literature and 
confirm that the gains from welfare reform in terms of increasing employment and reducing 
caseloads have come at a cost—lower education and training among women at risk for relying 
on welfare. Our finding that the effects appear to be concentrated among women with very low 
education has negative implications for this group’s ability to attain self-sufficiency and 
experience upward mobility. These negative effects of welfare reform on adult women’s 
education may have become even larger under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2006, which raised 
states’ work participation targets and narrowed the range of welfare-to-work activities that can 
be counted toward those targets, and during the recent economic downturn. Finally, the findings 
from this study contribute generally to the sparse economics literature on adult vocational 
education by identifying welfare policy as a determinant of vocational education and training, 
and underscore that public policies not specifically focusing on education can be important 
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Effects of Welfare Reform on Schooling Outcomes – Higher Education  
(replicates October CPS results of Dave et al. 2008) 
NHES 1991-2005 
 
Sample  Target: Unmarried Women with Children, Less than College-Educated, Ages 25-54 
Comparison: Unmarried Women with No Children, Less than College-Educated, Ages 25-54 













































Lagged  State  Covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-specific Trends  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adj.  R-squared  0.259 0.261 0.205 0.209 0.179 0.179 
Observations  3350 3350 2910 2910 2960 2960 
        
Sample Baseline Mean for Target 
Group  0.1157 0.1157 0.0695 0.0695 0.0532 0.0532 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are from linear probability models. The reference group in all models corresponds to no schooling. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary correlation 
within each state and reported in parentheses. All models include age and age squared, indicators for race and Hispanic ethnicity, indicators for high school graduate and less than 
high school, number of children less than 16 years of age in the household, number of residents in the household, urban residence, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the 
appropriate sampling probability weights. State covariates include state-level unemployment rate, real state personal income per capita, and indicators for state high school exit exam 
requirements. Lagged state covariates include one- and two-year lags of the welfare caseload, unemployment rate, and real personal income per capita. Significance is denoted as 
follows: *** p≤0.01, ** 0.01<p≤0.05, * 0.05<p≤0.10. All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 per National Center for Education Statistics guidelines.  Baseline mean 






Main Results--Effects of Welfare Reform on Vocational Education  
and Training and Employer Paid Schooling 
NHES 1991-2005 
 
Sample  Target: Unmarried Women with Children, Less than College-Educated, Ages 
25-54 
Comparison: Unmarried Women with No Children, Less than College-





















































Lagged  State  Covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.  R-squared  0.134 0.052 0.072 0.132 0.094 
Observations  4160 2660 2700 3860 4980 
       
Sample Baseline Mean for 
Target  Group  0.1795 0.0447 0.0176 0.1356 0.1359 
Notes: Any vocational education or training (1) includes full time (2), part-time (3), and other (4). Any employer-
paid schooling (5) includes (1) or any college. Coefficient estimates are from linear probability models. The 
reference group in all models corresponds to no schooling. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary correlation 
within each state and reported in parentheses. All models include age and age squared, indicators for race and 
Hispanic ethnicity, indicators for high school graduate and less than high school, number of children less than 16 
years of age in the household, number of residents in the household, urban residence, state fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and the appropriate sampling probability weights. State covariates include state-level unemployment rate, 
real state personal income per capita, and indicators for state high school exit exam requirements. Lagged state 
covariates include one- and two-year lags of the welfare caseload, unemployment rate, and real personal income per 
capita. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p≤0.01, ** 0.01<p≤0.05, * 0.05<p≤0.10. All sample sizes are 
rounded to the nearest 10 per National Center for Education Statistics guidelines. Baseline mean represents the 
weighted outcome mean for the analysis sample, for the target group, from 1991 and 1995 (excluding states in 1995 






Main Results--Effects of Welfare Reform on Vocational Education  
and Training and Employer Paid Schooling 
Controlling for State-specific Trends 
NHES 1991-2005 
 
Sample  Target: Unmarried Women with Children, Less than College-Educated, Ages 
25-54 
Comparison: Unmarried Women with No Children, Less than College-





















































Lagged  State  Covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-specific  Trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.  R-squared  0.134 0.053 0.082 0.131 0.095 
Observations  4160 2660 2700 3860 4980 
       
Sample Baseline Mean for 
Target  Group  0.1795 0.0447 0.0176 0.1356 0.1359 
Notes: Any vocational education or training (1) includes full time (2), part-time (3), and other (4). Any employer-
paid schooling (5) includes (1) or any college. Coefficient estimates are from linear probability models. The 
reference group in all models corresponds to no schooling. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary correlation 
within each state and reported in parentheses. All models include age and age squared, indicators for race and 
Hispanic ethnicity, indicators for high school graduate and less than high school, number of children less than 16 
years of age in the household, number of residents in the household, urban residence, state fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and the appropriate sampling probability weights. State covariates include state-level unemployment rate, 
real state personal income per capita, and indicators for state high school exit exam requirements. Lagged state 
covariates include one- and two-year lags of the welfare caseload, unemployment rate, and real personal income per 
capita. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p≤0.01, ** 0.01<p≤0.05, * 0.05<p≤0.10. All sample sizes are 
rounded to the nearest 10 per National Center for Education Statistics guidelines. Baseline mean represents the 
weighted outcome mean for the analysis sample, for the target group, from 1991 and 1995 (excluding states in 1995 






Effects of TANF on Vocational Education and Training 
Differential Effects by State Education Policy, Sanctions, and Benefits Generosity under TANF 
NHES 1991-2005 
 
Panel A  Differential Effects by State Education Policy 












































Adj.  R-squared  0.128 0.061 0.094 0.123 
Observations  2910 1830 1860 2690 
 
Panel B  Differential Effects by State Sanctions 












































Adj.  R-squared  0.127 0.059 0.092 0.123 
Observations  2910 1830 1860 2690 
 
Panel C  Differential Effects by State Benefits Generosity 












































Adj.  R-squared  0.128 0.061 0.094 0.123 
Observations  2910 1830 1860 2690 
Notes: See Tables 1 & 2. States which had implemented major waivers to their AFDC programs prior to 1995 are 
excluded from the sample. Models also control for interactions between the policy indicator and the target group 
indicator, and between the policy indicator and TANF. TANF represents the conditional difference between 1999, 






Effects of TANF on Vocational Education and Training 
Differential Effects by Formal Educational Attainment 
NHES 1991-2005 
 
Sample  Target: Unmarried Women with Children, Less than College-Educated, Ages 
25-54 
Comparison: Unmarried Women with No Children, Less than College-
Educated, Ages 25-54 
Outcome Any  Vocational 




































Lagged State Covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.133  0.131  0.094 
Observations 4160  3860  4980 
      
Sample Baseline Mean for 




Notes: Outcome definitions correspond to those in Table 2. Coefficient estimates are from linear probability models. 
The reference group in all models corresponds to no schooling. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary correlation 
within each state and reported in parentheses. All models include age and age squared, indicators for race and 
Hispanic ethnicity, indicators for high school graduate and less than high school, number of children less than 16 
years of age in the household, number of residents in the household, urban residence, state fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and the appropriate sampling probability weights. Models also control for interactions between welfare 
reform and high school graduate indicators, and between the target group and high school graduate indicators. State 
covariates include state-level unemployment rate, real state personal income per capita, and indicators for state high 
school exit exam requirements. Lagged state covariates include one- and two-year lags of the welfare caseload, 
unemployment rate, and real personal income per capita. Significance is denoted as follows: *** p≤0.01, ** 
0.01<p≤0.05, * 0.05<p≤0.10. All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 per National Center for Education 
Statistics guidelines.  Baseline mean represents the weighted outcome mean for the analysis sample, for the target 






Effects of Welfare Reform on Any Schooling 
NHES 1991-2005 
 
Sample  Target: Unmarried Women with Children, Less than College-Educated, 
Ages 25-54 
Comparison: Unmarried Women with No Children, Less than College-
Educated, Ages 25-54 
Outcome  Any Schooling  Any Schooling  Any Schooling  Any Schooling 

























Any Welfare Reform*Target* 









Lagged State Covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-specific  Trends  No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.187  0.187  0.186  0.187 
Observations 4980  4980  4980  4980 
        
Sample Baseline Mean for 
Target Group (from 1991 
survey) 0.2591  0.2591  0.2591  0.2591 
Notes: Any schooling includes any vocational education or training, or college. Coefficient estimates are from linear 
probability models. The reference group in all models corresponds to no schooling. Standard errors are adjusted for 
arbitrary correlation within each state and reported in parentheses. All models include age and age squared, 
indicators for race and Hispanic ethnicity, indicators for high school graduate and less than high school, number of 
children less than 16 years of age in the household, number of residents in the household, urban residence, state 
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the appropriate sampling probability weights. Models also control for 
interactions between welfare reform and high school graduate indicators, and between the target group and high 
school graduate indicators. State covariates include state-level unemployment rate, real state personal income per 
capita, and indicators for state high school exit exam requirements. Lagged state covariates include one- and two-
year lags of the welfare caseload, unemployment rate, and real personal income per capita. Significance is denoted 
as follows: *** p≤0.01, ** 0.01<p≤0.05, * 0.05<p≤0.10. All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 per National 
Center for Education Statistics guidelines. Baseline mean represents the weighted outcome mean for the analysis 
sample, for the target group, from 1991 and 1995 (excluding states in 1995 that had enacted statewide AFDC 
waivers).    




Appendix Table 1 
Effects of Welfare Reform on Schooling Outcomes 
Controlling for AFDC Waivers and TANF Separately 
NHES 1991-2005 
 
Sample  Target: Unmarried Women with Children, Less than College-Educated, Ages 25-54 
Comparison: Unmarried Women with No Children, Less than College-Educated, Ages 25-54 


















































































































Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.  R-squared  0.260 0.206 0.179 0.134 0.054 0.074 0.131 0.094 0.187 
Observations  3350 2910 2960 4160 2660 2700 3860 4980 4980 
 
Notes: See notes from Tables 1 and 2. Models 1-3 correspond to results reported in Table 1; models 4-8 correspond to results reported in Table 2; and model 9 
corresponds to specification 1 in Table 6. 
 
 